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Summary. — The energy transformation process beginning to take place in many
countries as a response to climate change will reduce substantially the consumption
of fossil fuels, but at the same time cause a large increase in the demand for other
raw materials. Whereas it is difficult to estimate the quantities of, for example,
iron, copper and aluminium required, the situation is somewhat simpler for the rare
elements that might be needed in a sustainable energy economy based largely on
photovoltaic sources, wind and possibly nuclear fusion. We consider briefly each of
these technologies and discuss the supply risks associated with the rare elements
required, if they were to be used in the quantities that might be required for a
global energy transformation process. In passing, we point out the need in resource
studies to define the terms “rare”, “scarce” and “critical” and to use them in a
consistent way.
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1. – Introduction
The transformation of the present energy supply system into one based largely on “re-
newable”, or perhaps better, “sustainable” sources is widely regarded as one of the global
challenges of the 21st century. The German Energiewende has attracted considerable at-
tention internationally and is regarded as being in the vanguard of this development: so
far, no other major industrial country has made a commitment of such magnitude. In
2010 the Federal Government adopted ambitious new targets for greenhouse gas emission
reductions, energy savings and the accelerated construction of renewable energy facili-
ties. A commitment was made to an 18% share of renewables in the total primary energy
market by 2020, in compliance with the EU 20-20-20 policy. Moreover, the Government
committed itself to a 60% contribution by 2050. Nuclear energy was foreseen only to play
the role of a “bridging technology” in order to ease the transition. Shortly afterwards, in
2011, however, the Government — acting in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster —
was forced by the weight of public opinion to shut down immediately 8 nuclear reactors
and to commit itself to closing the remaining 9 by 2022. This move was accompanied
by further legislation, known at the time as the “energy package”, to accelerate the ex-
tensions to the electricity grid, to promote energy efficiency and to reform the feed-in
tariff system. The term Energiewende is now usually taken to mean all the measures in
the areas of power generation, heating and transport — including those taken by pre-
vious governments prior to 2010 — in order to create sometime later in this century a
low-carbon economy in Germany.
Although this process will produce dramatic reductions in the use of fossil fuels, and
thus in CO2 emissions, it will require huge amounts of non-fuel raw materials. Vidal et
al. [1] estimate that, for equivalent installed capacity, solar and wind facilities require at
least an order of magnitude more concrete, glass, iron, copper and aluminium than fossil
fuel or nuclear energy power plants. The global energy transformation could therefore
lead to a substantial increase in demand for these materials. A conservative estimate for
the amount of copper required for this purpose (“in-use stock”) by 2050 is 50 million
tons [1], corresponding to roughly three times current annual production. (We note that
other sources [2] suggest a somewhat lower figure.) Even without such developments
recent trends in the consumption of raw materials have been dramatic: the average annual
growth rate for the extraction of industrially important metals has been almost 10% in
the last ten years, as fig. 1a — based on data from the United States Geological Survey
(USGS) [3] — shows. We also note from this plot that metal extraction increased by a
factor of 27 from 1905 to 2012. It can be compared with an increase in world population
by a factor of over four during the same period [4,5], showing that the increase per capita
is at least a factor of six! Figure 1b shows a comparison of the metal extraction rate
(actually the same curve as in fig. 1a) with global GDP, given in “1990 International
Dollar” using the “Maddison” data [6], in about the same period. Unsurprisingly, metal
extraction has grown at approximately the same rate as GDP in the hundred years up
to 2008. (“Maddison” GDP data for later years are not, or not yet, available in the
currency unit used.)
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Fig. 1. – a) The extraction of industrially important metals (in billion tons) in the period
1905–2012. All commonly used metals, such as iron, aluminium and copper (83%, 4% and 1%,
respectively, of the total in 2012) are included, as are rare metals which make up more than
0.01% of the total. For those years for which there are no data extrapolation and interpolation
has been used. Also shown is the growth in world population in the same period. Data from
USGS [3] and the United Nations [4, 5]. b) The extraction of industrially important metals
(as in a) compared with the growth of global GDP (in 1990 International Dollars). Data from
USGS [3] and the Maddison Historical Statistics [6].
The last hundred years have also been characterised by a remarkable increase in
the use of many rare elements that are indispensable for new technologies. (“Rare”
elements are normally defined as those that have a concentration in the earth’s crust of
less than 0.1%.) The generation, storage, transmission and exploitation of sustainable
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Fig. 2. – The large increase in the annual world production of rare-earth oxides since 1950. Data
from USGS [3].
energy forms in the global Energiewende, for example, will require large quantities of
rare elements. Besides photovoltaic panels, wind turbines and other applications in
the energy sector, other examples of advanced technologies which require certain rare
elements are to be found in information and communication technology, alloying for
steel and advanced materials, catalysis, nuclear power, lighting and superconductivity.
Some of these elements are already characterised by increases in the rate of extraction
considerably greater than the average curve in fig. 1. (The latter includes virtually all
industrially important metals; the factor 27 quoted above for this data set is largely
determined by iron, and to a lesser extent aluminium and copper.) An example is
provided by the annual global extraction of rare earth elements (REE), which are mined
and traded as the respective oxides (REO). In the first half of the last century annual
global REO extraction was on average ≈ 1500 t. There has been a phenomenal increase
since 1950, namely by a factor of 80, as shown in fig. 2, which is again based on data
from the (USGS) [3]. Similarly high, or even higher, growth factors have been recorded
for many other rare metals in recent decades. Figure 1 shows that the annual global
extraction rate of metals in general, and iron in particular, increased by only a factor of
12 in this period. Hitherto, rare metals had only been used in relatively small quantities
for a limited number of applications. Although much of this material will eventually be
recovered and re-used, it will— as in the case of the more common metals —increase the
“in-use” stock and not be available for recycling in the next few decades.
In recent years concern has been expressed about the potentially difficult, or critical,
supply situation that might develop — or in some cases perhaps, has already devel-
oped —in connection with mineral resources containing rare elements. These range from
alarmist articles in the popular press, to well-researched reports by various bodies, in-
cluding learned societies, and to papers in the scientific literature. Moreover, at least four
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Fig. 3. – Price development for the REE dysprosium and neodymium in the period 2009–2013
(at Chinese port of exit). After [17].
studies have been concerned specifically with energy-related materials [7-10]. Probably
most influential of the general reports on this topic was that of the National Research
Council (NRC) of the US National Academies in 2008, with the title “Minerals, critical
minerals, and the US economy” [11]. There are several criteria, or indicators, which
are potentially relevant in determining whether the availability situation of a particular
element is likely to become “critical”. For example, such a set of indicators and a corre-
sponding procedure for their application have recently been proposed, amongst others,
by Graedel et al. [12]. These can be divided into “supply risk”, “vulnerability to supply
restriction” and “environmental impact”. Supply risk, for example can be further di-
vided into indicators covering security of supply (in the political sense), the extraction of
the element as a by-product and possible geochemical scarcity due to mineral depletion.
Vulnerability to supply restriction includes, for example, the degree of importance of the
end product and the substitutability of the element. Achzet and Helbig [13] have recently
compared indicators for “supply risk” in these and other studies of “critical” elements.
We note in passing that the monopolistic position of China on the REO market in recent
years and the price bubble in 2011/12 shown in fig. 3 have given new meaning to the
notion of “security of supply”: beginning in the early 2000s the Chinese government
had imposed restrictions on the export of REE in order to regulate their industry more
stringently, in particular from the environmental point of view, and also to conserve sup-
plies of REE for their own manufacturers. The geopolitical connotations of this move
gave, however, rise to concern. Figure 3 shows specifically data for the rare-earth ele-
ments neodymium and dysprosium [14] that are discussed in sect. 2 in connection with
permanent magnet material for wind turbines.
As we have noted, it has become usual in resource studies to refer to “critical” minerals
when there is the possibility of restricted availability. Strictly speaking, minerals or
the corresponding elements they contain, are not “critical” in themselves, at least not
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according to the usual dictionary definitions of the word [15], although this form of
usage is increasing. Rather, it is the situation, or state of a system, brought about by
some attribute or property, which is said to become critical. In the physical sciences the
word “critical” is used strictly in connection with a point at which the state of a system
converts into a second state described by new parameters, as in a phase transition; hence,
“critical point”, “critical angle” or “critical mass”. The latter is particularly well known
as the minimum mass of fissile material required for the occurrence of a nuclear chain
reaction. By analogy, “critical” in the minerals context should therefore perhaps only be
used to describe the situation that pertains when one or more indicators corresponding
to particular attributes or properties cross a (previously determined) threshold value.
Particularly confusing is the use of the word “criticality” in this context, which is normally
used to describe the behaviour or state of a physical system at and above the critical point.
Whereas Graedel et al. [12] use their indicators to derive semi-quantitatively an over-
all “criticality score” for each element, indicating that the state of being “critical” is a
matter of degree, other groups use the concept “critical” in a similar way to that in the
physical sciences. Thus, in a report of the EU Commission on critical raw materials in
2010 [16], two composite indicators “supply risk” und “economic importance” are defined
and threshold values for each proposed. Materials exceeding both of these values are des-
ignated “critical”. Originally, 41 non-fuel materials were investigated in the EU report.
The 14 materials designated as “critical” were antimony, beryllium, cobalt, fluorspar,
gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, magnesium, niobium, the platinum group metals
(PGMs), the REE, tantalum and tungsten. In a second study in 2014 [16], using the
same indicators and, most importantly, the same thresholds, borates, chromium, coking
coal, magnesite, phosphate rock and silicon “metal” were included. Tantalum, however,
dropped out. Space does not permit us to discuss in detail the indicators per se that are
used in these studies, but we do return to specific ones below and discuss the effect of
mineral depletion generally in the final section.
The present article is concerned with rare elements, mostly metals and often referred
to as “minor metals”, which might be required for a global Energiewende. For this pur-
pose we assume that sustainable energy forms, in particular, wind and photovoltaics
will be providing worldwide 60% of our total energy supply by 2050. (It is implicitly
assumed that in future electricity generation will play a much more important role in
energy production for the heating and transport sectors.) Similarly, we look at nuclear
fusion, which may contribute to generating capacity in the second half of the century
and also requires rare elements. For each of the three technologies order of magnitude
estimates are made of the required “in-use” stock of these elements and the possibility
of geochemical scarcity is examined. Moreover, we also discuss the factors, or indicators,
which may be of greatest significance for supply risk and vulnerability. These are the
substitutability of rare-earth–based permanent magnets in wind turbines and the “ex-
traction as by-product” problem for the minor metals used in thin film photovoltaics as
well as for helium required for fusion. The present account is based on some of our recent
papers [17-19].
EPJ Web of Conferences
04007-p.6
2. – Strong permanent magnets for wind turbines
In the last few years there has been a spectacular rise in the use of certain rare-
earth elements (REE) in the manufacture of high-field permanent magnets, in particular
for the transport and energy sectors. On account of its high remanence and high co-
ercivity the intermetallic compound neodymium iron boride (Nd2Fe14B), developed by
Sagawa [20] and Croat [21] in 1983 is at present the material of choice for permanent
magnets in synchronous motors in a wide variety of applications. This is particularly
true for the electric motor in battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and hybrid electric vehicles
(HEVs), and for wind turbines. The material also contains normally praseodymium and
dysprosium (and/or perhaps terbium). Dysprosium is very important, as it increases
the coercivity and extends the temperature range in which the high field can be pro-
duced. Hatch [22] gives the composition for various grades of magnet material: whereas,
for example, a composition (by weight) of 23% Nd, 8% Pr and 1% Dy gives a maxi-
mum working temperature of 80 ◦C, 14% Nd, 5% Pr and 12% Dy extends the maximum
working temperature to 240 ◦C and trebles the coercivity. Current R&D on this material
focuses on the improvement of magnet production techniques such that smaller quantities
of dysprosium can be used (“Dy-saving technology”).
Are there alternatives to rare earth-based permanent magnets in electric motors? To
answer this question we look briefly at electric motors in general (an electric genera-
tor is essentially identical, but the direction of energy flow is reversed). The two main
categories of AC motor are the synchronous motor and the asynchronous motor; the
latter is also termed induction motor [23, 24]. Synchronous motors have a rotor which
contains either permanent magnets, or electromagnets constructed from copper wind-
ings. Induction motors have no such windings on the rotor, which consists of iron and
contains a so-called squirrel cage which is usually made from aluminium, or sometimes
copper. The stator is the same for synchronous and asynchronous motors and contains
copper windings which generate a rotating magnetic field. These two motor types are
compared in the schematic diagrams of figs. 4a and 4b. As the name suggests, the rotor
of the synchronous motor follows this magnetic field synchronously, whereas the rotor
of the asynchronous motor turns at a lower rotational velocity (the “slip”). Another
electromagnetic phenomenon which can be used for electric motors is the so-called re-
luctance. This is the property of ferromagnetic material to align itself along magnetic
field lines, similar to the magnetic needle of a compass. It is used in a motor with a
so-called salient-pole rotor (see fig. 4c). In the stator a rotating magnetic field is created
with which the poles of the rotor align. The rotation of the magnetic field in the stator
is generated by successively activating and deactivating the copper windings; the rotor
then follows. As in the case of the induction motor, no permanent magnets are needed;
the rotor just consists of ferromagnetic material such as iron or steel.
Wind generators have been traditionally located on land, but offshore wind generation,
i.e. wind turbines located in the sea up to tens of km from the coast, has great potential,
since average wind speed is higher and electricity is generated more continuously than at
onshore sites. However, the current cost for offshore wind generators remains quite high
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Fig. 4. – Three types of electric machine. After [17].
(because of the additional expenses of installation, servicing and grid connection) which
has resulted in an initially slow exploitation of this possibility. Just like the situation
for any producer of electricity connected to the grid, the alternating current (AC) from
a wind turbine has to be synchronized with the grid. Earlier types of wind generator
were designed for only one rotational speed in accordance with the frequency of the grid.
For more freedom as to the rotational velocity of the wind turbine, power electronics
can be used to link the generator to the electricity grid. Traditionally, gearboxes have
been used in wind turbines to connect the slowly turning rotor blades with an induction
generator in the so-called nacelle. However, these gearboxes can be quite susceptible to
faults, and even to complete failure, giving rise to considerable maintenance needs. Wind
turbines without a gearbox (“direct drive”) have therefore been on the market since the
mid 1990s. Here, the synchronous generator and the electricity grid are connected via
an AC-DC-AC converter: the AC produced in the generator is rectified to direct current
(DC) in a first step and then converted back to AC in accordance with the requirements
of the grid in a second step. Thus, the rotational velocity of the generator is completely
independent of the grid frequency. As this configuration makes the gearbox unnecessary,
the technology is particularly advantageous for offshore wind generators where the cost
of maintenance is particularly high. Generally speaking, all types of electric machine can
be used in wind turbines, but only synchronous generators can be used for direct drive.
Hence, the gearless technology was first implemented using synchronous generators with
electromagnetic windings on the rotor. Since the size of wind generators has increased
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in order to raise the power output, this technology has led to a considerable demand for
copper and a significant increase in the weight of the nacelle. This was the reason for
substituting the electrically excited rotor by one with permanent magnets, which allows
substantial weight reductions and an increase in efficiency of the generator. However, the
price of a generator using permanent magnets is higher (about 25%) than the alternative
with an electromagnet [24].
In summary, direct drive is often the preferred technology particularly for offshore
wind parks. For this purpose, permanent magnets can be used, but do not necessarily
have to be used. Thus, the development of the relative prices of REE and copper might
well decide which of the alternative gearless wind turbine technologies will be utilized
in the next few years. In 2013 the market share of direct drive generators was ca. 20%
worldwide [25] and ca. 50% in Germany [26]. We have not been able to estimate reliably
the current market share of permanent magnet technology in direct drive generators.
The REE consist of lanthanum and the subsequent 14 elements of successively higher
atomic number, known as the lanthanides. Yttrium and scandium, occurring in the same
vertical group of the Periodic Table as lanthanum, are normally included because they
have similar properties. In the lanthanide series the 4f shell is successively filled, which
gives rise to interesting spectroscopic and magnetic properties, but the chemical proper-
ties are very similar, which makes separation difficult. This turns out to be a particular
problem for extraction because the rare earth elements never occur singly in the various
ores. Rare earths are produced mainly from monazite (CeYPO4), as in the Mount Weld
mine (Australia), and bastna¨site (CeFCO3), as in Bayan Obo (China) and Mountain
Pass (California). (All the rare-earth atoms can substitute for the cerium atom.) Both
minerals consist almost exclusively of the light rare-earth elements (LREE), yttrium to
europium, in particular lanthanum, cerium and neodymium. The corresponding heavy
REE, gadolinium to lutetium, are obtained from other minerals, in particular xenotime
and the clay deposits in Southern China. The percentage of the much-coveted HREE
dysprosium (see below) in xenotime can be as high as 9%. We note in passing that most
of the rare-earth deposits also contain uranium and thorium and that because of radioac-
tivity this could constitute a hazard for personnel and for the environment. China has
been the major producer of rare earths in the last decades with a 95–98% market share.
Largely because of environmental concerns, which apply not only to extraction but to a
lesser extent also to separation, mining activities effectively came to an end in the US
and Australia ten years ago. Due to the recent re-opening of the Mountain Pass mine
in 2012, the dominance of China is now beginning to decrease and its share of global
production fell to 91% in 2013, according to the USGS [27].
Global mine production of rare earths was 0.10Mt (as REO) in 2013 [24]. The crustal
abundance of cerium, the most plentiful REE, is 83 ppm, that of lutetium, the rarest,
0.8 ppm [28]. Reserves are currently estimated to be 140Mt (= million metric tons),
55Mt of which are thought to be in China [27]. (“Reserves” are deposits in or on the
Earth’s crust that can be exploited economically at the present time. “Resources” are
defined as deposits in such a condition that economic extraction is potentially feasible.
Resources can be further divided into “identified” and “undiscovered”. In many cases,
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the reserves represent only a very small fraction of the resources. Also frequently quoted
is the reserves-to-primary production ratio, or “static lifetime”, which is in practice not
a measure of resource availability, but rather an indication of the time in which mining
costs, and possibly prices, are — other factors being equal — likely to remain stable.) The
reserves of neodymium and praseodymium would probably be about 20% of this figure.
A very rough guess for the reserves of dysprosium would give about 1% (1Mt), since this
REE is essentially only a trace element in most bastna¨site and monazite minerals. The ex-
tent of the resources is unknown. The USGS states: “Rare earths are relatively abundant
in the Earth’s crust, but discovered minable concentrations are less common than for most
ores. US and world resources are contained primarily in bastna¨site and monazite” and
“Undiscovered resources are thought to be very large relative to expected demand” [27].
We now make an order of magnitude estimate for the amount of rare-earth elements,
primarily neodymium and dysprosium, that could be required by 2050 as a consequence
of a global energy transformation process, or Energiewende. Total global primary energy
supply in 2011 was 13,113 Mtoe, or 152,100TWh, according to the International Energy
Agency (IEA) statistics [29]. We assume that this will double by the year 2050, as was
roughly the case between 1973 and 2011 [29], to give 300,000TWh. Furthermore, if
renewables provide 60%, we arrive at a contribution of 150,000TWh, after taking into
account a 10% share of renewables in the form of biomass which is used for heating etc.
The share of renewables in electricity production would actually have to be much higher in
order to reach a 60% contribution to total energy supply. At this point the assumptions
in any case become rather arbitrary, but it should be remembered that we are only
attempting an “order of magnitude” estimation! Assuming that wind, solar thermal and
PV will have equal shares and that hydro and various other renewable energy forms will
only contribute 10%, we obtain a figure of 45000TWh for wind energy. Converting to
power and assuming a rather high capacity factor of 50%, we obtain for the “global wind
park” 10TW installed capacity (compared to 282GWp in 2012). A figure of 100–200 kg
REE per MW is normally quoted as the requirement for neodymium-based permanent
magnets [22, 30, 31]. This gives a figure of 1–2Mt REE for the required in-use stock in
the year 2050. This is only a small fraction of the reserves summed over all seventeen
REE as currently estimated by the USGS. However, the requirement is for specific rare
earths, such as dysprosium, one of the HREE. The number of known, workable deposits
for these is decidedly smaller than that for the LREE, as is reflected in the relative prices
of neodymium and dysprosium in fig. 2. The estimated 1–2Mt requirement could be
comparable to the total amount of dysprosium metal in the reserves (see above). In
connection with permanent magnets Alonso et al. [31] have modelled demand for wind
energy using various scenarios, but assume generally a much lower market penetration
than in our “order of magnitude” estimate here.
3. – Thin film photovoltaic modules
Globally, about 30GWp of new photovoltaic (PV) capacity was installed in 2012 [32].
The thin film materials cadmium telluride, amorphous silicon and copper indium gallium
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Fig. 5. – Thin film photocells, a-Si, CdTe, CIGS. After [17].
diselenide {Cu(InxGa1−x)Se2}, or CI(G)S, had PV market shares in that year of 6.3%,
4.5% and 1.1%, respectively [32]. At the time of writing, figures for 2013 are not yet
available. Schematic diagrams of the three cells are shown in fig. 5. Note that the thin
film of transparent conducting oxide (TCO) in all three cases is usually indium tin oxide
(ITO), the latter being a ubiquitous material in many display and conductive coating
applications. Molybdenum (Mo) is used as a substrate for CIGS cells, because of the
high temperature required in the production process. In general, thin film modules have
lower efficiencies than those based on crystalline silicon technology, but are cheaper to
manufacture. Module efficiencies are normally given as 12–14%, 12–14% and 6–9% for
CdTe, CIGS and a-Si, respectively, compared with a value of up to 20% for single crystal
silicon. We note, however, that “best” module efficiencies are still increasing for CdTe
and CIGS: 17.0% [33] and 15.7% [34], respectively, have recently been reported. Of the
thin film modules CIGS has allegedly the highest manufacturing costs. In the context of
the present article it is important to note that all five elements concerned are by-products
in the production process of a primary resource. For cadmium and indium this is zinc;
for gallium, mainly aluminium; for selenium and tellurium, copper or lead [35]. In fact,
they are extracted exclusively on this basis; there are no cadmium mines, for example,
because there are few or no minable deposits of this element. By-products can be very
important for the profitability of a mine, i.e. for the extraction of the primary product.
Once the ore has been mined, the additional expense of extracting low concentration
by-products during mineral processing operations (“beneficiation”) is relatively low. On
the other hand, the fact that a rare metal is extracted as a by-product can entail a
certain supply risk, if demand for the host mineral or element suddenly falls, as Graedel
et al. [12] have pointed out. We now briefly review the long-term supply risk for these
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Table I. – Rare elements for thin film solar cells. Note that, where appropriate, the figures
refer to the year 2011, unless otherwise stated. Annual production includes secondary material.
Sources: refs. [27,35-42].
cadmium tellurium indium gallium selenium
crustal
abundance 0.2 0.001 0.1 15 0.05
(ppm)
“host”
element Zn mainly Cu Zn mainly Al mainly Cu
reserves,
resources 0.64, 5.0(a) 0.024, 0.1(a) 0.011(b) 1.0(c) 0.092(b)
(Mt) (2008)
annual
production 28 ≈ 0.5 1.8 0.31 3.5
(kt)
% thereof






Resources, reserves proprietary information.
five elements with the help of table I. (Note that, for consistency, most of the data in
table I derive from the year 2011, if available.)
The metal cadmium is used mainly for nickel-cadmium batteries, although inside the
EU the sale of new batteries is forbidden (except for some special applications) because
of its toxicity. Li-Ion batteries are in any case replacing NiCd batteries in many consumer
applications, because of the higher energy density, although the price is approximately
double. As noted above, cadmium is a by-product in zinc mining, where it substitutes
atomically to the extent of about 0.3% for zinc in sphalerite (ZnS). Other rare elements
similarly present in sphalerite in concentrations up to a few tenths of a percent include
gallium, germanium and sometimes indium. The module manufacturer First Solar has
recently instituted “the industry’s first comprehensive, prefunded module collection and
recycling program”, presumably in response to concerns about the toxicity of cadmium.
The USGS gives a figure of 640 kt for the reserves corresponding to a reserves-to-primary
production ratio, or static lifetime, of 28 years.
The situation with regard to the very rare metalloid tellurium could perhaps be
described as “critical”. The source of 90% of tellurium is copper ore, in which the
element may be present in a concentration of up to 1 × 10−6 relative to the copper.
(Other by-products of copper mining may include gold, selenium, antimony and the
platinum group metals.) A small amount of tellurium is also obtained as by-product
in the mining of zinc, lead, gold, nickel and platinum. Potential primary ore sources
have also been identified. Tellurium and the other by-products are extracted from the
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anode slime produced in electrolytic copper refining. (We note that the leach/solvent
extraction/electrowinning technique for processing copper does not capture tellurium
and selenium.) Of all five rare metals considered in this section it is only tellurium
for which solar cell manufacture consumes a very significant part of annual production:
38%, compared to 0.6%, 1%, 2% and 1% for Cd, In, Ga and Se, respectively. Other
uses include thermoelectrics (30%), alloying (15%) and vulcanisation (5%). Tellurium
reserves of 24 kt correspond to a reserves-to-primary production ratio of 50 years.
Indium, like cadmium, is mainly obtained from zinc deposits, where it substitutes
for zinc in sphalerite (ZnS), but at the most in a concentration of 0.01%. The largest
producer of primary indium is China, which maintains an export quota. Substantial
quantities of indium derive from recycling the material which is left over from the rather
inefficient process of sputtering ITO (indium tin oxide) layers [37]. Substantially more
than 50% of indium produced is used for ITO layers in liquid crystal displays (LCDs),
plasma displays, touch panels, organic light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and solar cells. Other
uses include solders and alloys, as well as III-V semiconductors for LEDs and laser diodes.
To a current (2011) indium requirement of 16 t for CIGS cells we have to add about 6 t for
(thinner) TCO layers in all three thin film solar cells Presumably because of the difficulty
of obtaining reliable data, the USGS currently does not quote the global reserves; in 2008
a figure of 11 kt was given.
Gallium is extracted almost exclusively from the aluminium ore bauxite, but with a
very small amount coming from sphalerite. Gallium production increased by 19% in 2011.
Since the majority of gallium is used for the manufacture of GaAs, and to a lesser extent,
GaN devices, this reflects the currently expanding market for “smart” phones [39]. In an
analogous way to indium we estimate the amount of gallium required for the manufacture
of CIGS solar modules in 2011 as 5 t, corresponding to 1–2% of annual production. The
USGS [27] makes no attempt to estimate the gallium reserves, pointing out that only a
certain proportion of the gallium in bauxite and sphalerite is extractable, but the details
are proprietary. The world resources of gallium in bauxite are estimated to be 1Mt.
The situation with regard to selenium, a non-metal, is very similar to that of tellurium:
not only does it come between sulphur and tellurium in the same group of the periodic
table, but it is also an important by-product in copper mining and extraction. With
a crustal abundance of 0.05 ppm it is, however, not quite as rare as tellurium. Note
that the concentration of by-product — selenium, tellurium, gold and antimony, etc. —
depends on the copper ore. The main uses of selenium are alloying (40%), glass (25%) and
agriculture (10%); we estimate that solar cell manufacture required only 32 t, or about
1%, in 2011. Reserves are given as 92 kt [27], assuming that copper remains virtually
the only source, which corresponds to a reserves-to-production ratio of about 30 years.
As in the case of tellurium, the USGS gives no figure for the selenium resources. Note
that nickel also contains selenium, as does coal (between 0.5 and 12 ppm). The latter is
probably a potentially large-scale, if at present uneconomical, source [27].
As in the case of wind power, we can — using similar assumptions — make an order
of magnitude estimate of the amounts of these five elements that could be required by
2050 as a consequence of global energy transformation process. We assume that there is
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a 60% market penetration by renewables, giving a total of 150 000TWh, and that wind,
solar thermal and PV will have equal shares, besides 10% for various other renewable
energy forms. This gives a figure of 45 000TWh for PV. Very arbitrarily, we give CdTe
and CIGS a one third share of the PV market each. After converting to power and
assuming a (generous!) 25% capacity factor, 7TWp for each type of module is obtained.
Using literature values for the amounts of the five elements required per TWp [35,41], the
resulting material requirements for the “in-use stock” in 2050 would be 6×105 t, 7×105 t,
2×105 t, 5×104 t and 3×105 t for cadmium, tellurium, indium (including ITO), gallium
and selenium, respectively. It is unlikely that there will be availability problems for
cadmium due to mineral depletion, but the figure of 7× 105 t for tellurium, for example,
is a factor 20 higher than the reserves(USGS), and probably greater than the identified
resources. It may be possible to reduce the amounts of the elements required relative
to the power rating by increasing the module efficiency, but this would probably not be
more than a few percent. More promising would be the manufacture of modules with
substantially reduced film thicknesses, which is thought to be technically possible [35].
We should remind ourselves, however, that one of the assumptions made above, namely,
that thin film technology rather than crystalline silicon technology dominates in 2050, is
rather optimistic. Despite the recent improvements in the module efficiency of thin film
devices, the actual market share and hence the demand for these metals in the energy
sector may remain quite small
4. – Nuclear fusion
Figure 6 shows a schematic of the international ITER experiment currently under
construction in Cadarache, France. The aim of ITER is to demonstrate the viability
of producing electricity from nuclear fusion for commercial purposes. However, even if
ITER proves to be a success, numerous technical issues will still have to be solved first
in a demonstration power plant. Fusion reactors could make a substantial contribution
to electricity supply in the second half of this century. The fuels required are lithium,
actually lithium-6, from which the necessary tritium will be bred in situ using the fusion
neutrons, and deuterium. The schematic of such a power plant in fig. 7 also shows the
tritium breeding system. Neutrons will, however, be lost through parasitic absorption
in the structural materials of the reactor. To achieve tritium self-sufficiency, it will be
necessary to employ a neutron multiplier, such as beryllium or lead, producing further
neutrons via (n, 2n) reactions in the so-called blanket of the reactor. In a previous
publication [18] we have shown that, as expected, deuterium will never become a problem
from the supply point of view. It is present to the extent of 1 part in 6400 (156 ppm)
in naturally occurring hydrogen and for fusion purposes would probably be extracted
by electrolysis of heavy water obtained via isotopic exchange. Lead is not considered
to be a serious problem either, since the identified resources lie in the Gigaton range.
The supply situation for lithium could become critical, however, depending to what
extent the metal will be used in future for lithium-ion batteries, in particular for electric
vehicles. Beryllium is also a potential problem. In the next paragraph we examine the
EPJ Web of Conferences
04007-p.14
Fig. 6. – The international ITER fusion experiment currently under construction. ITER is
based on the “tokamak” principle of magnetic confinement, in which the plasma is contained in
a doughnut-shaped vacuum vessel. The fuel — a mixture of deuterium and tritium, two isotopes
of hydrogen — is heated to temperatures in excess of 150 million ◦C, forming a very hot plasma.
Strong magnetic fields are used to keep the plasma away from the walls; these are produced by
superconducting coils surrounding the vessel, and by an electrical current driven through the
plasma (see the contribution by Ongena in the present Volume). Source: ITER Organisation,
Cadarache.
availability of lithium and beryllium and try to assess future requirements of lithium for
electric vehicles. The lithium and beryllium requirements for fusion are then summarised,
assuming that this energy carrier will make a substantial contribution to energy supply
sometime in the second half of this century. We note here that lithium-6, deuterium,
beryllium and lead are actually “fuels” and are consumed in the nuclear fusion reactor.
Subsequently, helium and niobium, which are also materials required for fusion reactors,
but not “fuels”, will be examined.
The USGS gives global lithium reserves and resources as 13Mt and ca. 40Mt, respec-
tively [27]; the crustal abundance is 20 ppm [28]. In 2010 the USGS increased its estimate
of reserves largely as a result of a re-assessment of the potential of the salt brines under
the salars in South America and China. Lithium reserves are divided up approximately
2:1 between brines and minerals, mainly spodumene, a lithium aluminium silicate. In
seawater the lithium concentration is on average 0.17 ppm, or 0.17 g per ton. Multiplying
by the total volume of seawater gives a lithium content of 226 000Mt. Annual production
in 2012 was 37000 t (recycling is insignificant); the ceramics and glass industry remains
the major user with 30%, followed by batteries, 22%. Beryllium is significantly rarer with
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Fig. 7. – Schematic of a possible future fusion power plant. Source: Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r
Plasmaphysik (IPP).
a crustal abundance of 2.8 ppm, but neither metal is as rare as, for instance, tellurium
(see above) or platinum [28]. Despite its presence in over 90 known minerals, only beryl
(a beryllium aluminium silicate) and bertrandite (a beryllium sorosilicate hydroxide) oc-
cur in minable concentrations. The USGS does not give a figure for the reserves, but
estimates the resources as 80 kt, although it is not clear from where this value comes.
Annual mine production was 230 t in 2012, with a further 70 t probably coming from re-
cycling. Craig et al. [28] note “The restriction on production is two-fold. First, deposits
are small and quite expensive to work. Second, the separation of beryllium is a very
expensive and exacting process.” Most of the world’s beryllium currently derives from a
single American supplier.
How much lithium will be needed for non-fusion purposes in coming years? It is
currently accepted that batteries, for both full battery electric vehicles (BEV) and hybrid
electric vehicles (HEV), will lead to a massive increase in demand, and this will dominate
the market in the next few decades. We deliberately present a “worst case” scenario:
If we assume that i) the whole global vehicle fleet of approx. 109 units is “electrified”
over the next 40 years linearly in time, ii) plug-in hybrids with 16 kWh batteries are the
system of choice (completely electric vehicles will require larger batteries), iii) 400 g Li are
required per kWh [43] and iv) recycling takes place after ten years with 80% efficiency,
then approximately 10Mt lithium will be required by 2050, of which about half would
probably result from recycled material. (At present, practically no lithium is recycled.)
A figure of about 5Mt is lower than the present known reserves (13Mt), and considerably
lower than the identified resources. If lithium-ion batteries were also to find large-scale
application in electricity storage for industrial and domestic purposes, then there would
be greater cause for concern.
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How much lithium and beryllium would be required if fusion were to make a sub-
stantial contribution to electricity supply? Here, we use data from the European DEMO
reactor study [44] as well as the results of calculations reported in ref. [18]. In one of the
two reactor concepts the blanket consists of lithium ceramic pebbles as breeder material
and beryllium pebbles as multiplier (He-cooled pebble bed — HCPB) with 2.4GW fusion
power and 1GWe. Using the same figure as for wind and PV above, namely 45000TWh,
we arrive at a total of 5140 power stations that will be required globally. (In our previous
paper we made similar estimates but for a lower contribution of fusion to global electricity
supply [18].) These would consume 1.5 kt lithium-6, for which 18.7 kt of natural, non-
enriched lithium would be required annually (the so-called burn up). Thus, the present
lithium reserves of 13Mt (see above) would correspond to a reserves-to-production ratio
of 695 years, if used only for fusion. The sum of the lithium inventories for all power
plants would be 18.5 kt lithium-6, corresponding to 231 kt natural lithium and represent-
ing about 2% of the reserves. This situation for lithium might be regarded as critical,
but mainly due to the possible demand for electric vehicles. On the other hand, if we
consider the potential of seawater, then there is enough lithium, at least theoretically,
for the operation of 5140 power plants for 12 million years! The beryllium burn-up in
5140 HCPB power plants would be 524 t annually and the initial loading 616 kt, probably
exceeding considerably the putative resources. Whereas it is conceivable that the first
generation of fusion power plants would use a beryllium multiplier, a scarcity of beryllium
due to mineral depletion (or perhaps better expressed: due to the apparent exhaustion
of conventional deposits) might encourage the development of a breeding blanket with
a Pb-Li eutectic acting both as breeder and nuclear multiplier, as in the helium-cooled
lithium lead (DEMO-HCLL) concept [44].
Two further elements will probably be required in large quantities in future fusion
reactors, but not as “fuels”. Helium, on the assumption that “high temperature” su-
perconductors will not be available, will be needed as cryogenic medium and as coolant
in the power conversion system. Niobium is an important constituent of the supercon-
ducting material comprising the magnetic field coils. Nuclear fusion actually produces
helium, not only in the breeding and fusion reactions but also in the beryllium multiplier.
However, it is unlikely that the losses — even with efficient recovery systems — would
be compensated by the helium produced. After briefly describing the origin of terrestrial
helium and the current supply situation, we estimate possible helium requirements for
fusion, before turning our attention, very briefly, to niobium.
Although helium is the second most abundant element in the universe, the average
concentration in the Earth’s crust is probably not even in the ppb range, and in the
atmosphere it is only 5.2 ppm by volume [45,46]. The majority derives from the nuclear
decay of uranium and thorium. Most of the helium thus created has diffused to the surface
and escaped into the atmosphere over the last 4 billion years. A small fraction, however,
has been trapped by impermeable layers of rock. Natural gas, consisting mainly of
methane, also collects in such geological constellations, so that helium for commercial use
is normally produced from natural gas, where it is a minor component in concentrations
up to, but very rarely exceeding, about one per cent [47]. It can be calculated that about
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1×1014 t helium has passed into the Earth’s atmosphere since the formation of the planet.
Yet the concentration of helium in the Earth’s atmosphere (5.2 ppm) corresponds to a
total of only 3.5× 109 t, and is presumed to have remained more or less constant on the
geological time scale. This means that about 1014 t must also have been lost from the
upper atmosphere during this period. The reason is that the magnetosphere contains a
very dilute helium-hydrogen plasma, the ions of which spiral along the Earth’s magnetic
field lines. Whereas the latter normally remain closed, the interaction with the solar wind
above the poles causes magnetic reconnection to take place, so that the field lines open up
and the plasma can escape along them into interplanetary space (the polar wind) [48].
We note, firstly, that only a very small fraction, less than 10−7, of the total amount
of the radiogenic helium formed in the Earth’s crust in the last four billion years has
accumulated, fortuitously and fortunately, in appropriate geological strata. Secondly,
despite this huge amount of helium that has passed through the Earth’s atmosphere,
the annual rate of production in the crust is only about 3 × 103 t per year. There is
no prospect of tapping into this supply, because of the high degree of dispersion of the
sources, i.e. the radioactive nuclei in various minerals.
The total helium reserves and the identified resources as of 2013 are given by the
USGS [27] as 1.3Mt and 8.5Mt, respectively, (i.e. a factor of several hundred less than
the amount of helium in the atmosphere.) The US, Qatar, Algeria and Russia have the
largest resources at their disposal. Current (2013) global production is 23 kt per year, of
which 65% were extracted in the United States [27]. A further 8 kt were withdrawn from
the Clifford Field storage reservoir. New helium plants in conjunction with liquid natural
gas production will shortly come online in Algeria and Qatar. Reliable figures for usage
are only available for the US, but are not expected to be vastly different globally. For
the year 2011 the figures were: Cryogenics (in particular magnetic resonance imaging,
but also research in the physical sciences) 32%, pressurising and purging 18%, welding
(as protective gas) 13%, leak detection 4%, breathing mixtures 2% and others (including
party balloons!) 13% [46]. Helium supply in the last few years has been characterised
by shortages and by price rises [49]. The latter, however, have been moderate because
there is not a free market in helium. The price is essentially determined by the price
at which the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) sells off the helium from Clifford
Field. In the next few years, the supply situation will undoubtedly change due to the new
helium production facilities outside the US described above, but also — in the opposite
sense — by the recommendation of the National Academies of Science in the 2010 report
not to run down the federal reserve as originally envisaged by the US Congress. This
is a complicated issue, but it suffices here to note that there is at present no scarcity of
helium due to depletion. However, the quantity of helium stored in natural gas deposits
is finite: the danger exists that natural gas will be exhausted in the next 100 years or so
without the helium being extracted and perhaps conserved for future generations.
Following ref. [19], and taking into account the paper of Clarke and Cai [50], we
estimate the helium losses in a future fusion power station. Based on the planning for
ITER [51], it would appear that the cryogenic system for DEMO, including the on-
site infrastructure, would require about 34 t helium. The necessary helium inventory in
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the power conversion system of DEMO has been estimated at about 23 t [52], giving a
total helium inventory of about 60 t. The existing evidence (other large systems such as
CERN, the planning for ITER, design optimisation)suggests that annual losses could be
about 2 t per year. On the plus side, the combined helium production in DEMO from
the breeding reaction, the fusion reaction and, in the case of the HCPB, the multiplier
would be about 0.6 t. Since a lead multiplier does not produce α-particles, the figure for
the HCLL variant is lower at about 0.4 t. The current (2013) global helium production
rate from both natural gas and the US reserve of 31 kt p. a. (see above) corresponds to
a reserves/resources-to-production ratio, or static lifetime, of 280 years. What difference
would fusion make? We use the scenario above: 5140 power plants (similar to DEMO
HCPB or HCLL), which would provide 45000TWh p. a. some time in the second half of
the century. The total helium inventory of all power plants is 0.3Mt, which is about 4%
of the identified global resources. Annual losses would be 10 kt, decreasing the resources-
to-production ratio to 210 years. Fusion as a non-sustainable consumer of helium would
thus exacerbate an already difficult situation. Potentially more serious is the effective
exhaustion of helium in the Earth’s crust as a result of mankind’s unslakeable thirst
for “cheap” fossil fuel. We can only emphasise again, as have Nuttal et al. [46] in their
Nature article, that natural gas will soon be drastically depleted without the helium
being extracted and conserved. Mankind would then only have recourse to the expensive
and logistically complicated production of helium from the atmosphere [53].
Finally, we turn to niobium which is required in fusion for the superconducting mag-
netic field coils consisting of Nb3Sn and/or NbTi. This rare metal with a crustal abun-
dance of 10–20 ppm is mainly extracted from the mineral pyrochlore (Na,Ca)2Nb2O6
in Brazil. It also occurs together with tantalum (same group of the periodic table) in
the mineral columbite-tantalite, (FeMn)(Ta,Nb)2O6, which is mined mainly in Australia
for its tantalum content and sometimes referred to as “coltan” [28]. The USGS gives
the current global niobium production as 69 kt; the reserves are estimated to be at least
4Mt [27], resulting in a reserves-to-production ratio of at least 60 years. The extent of
the resources is unknown. Main uses at present are for special steels and superalloys;
the amount of metal required at present for manufacturing Nb-based superconductor
appears to be very small in comparison, but no exact figures are available. The ITER
experiment requires about 175 t niobium for its toroidal and poloidal field coils [54].
Assuming DEMO will be similar and rounding up to 200 t per reactor, the 45000TWh
scenario for fusion above would require an in-use stock of 1Mt niobium, i.e. about a
quarter of the currently identified reserves. Lack of information concerning the resources
and, on the fusion side, concerning end-of-life recycling prevent us from drawing any
conclusions about the niobium situation at present.
5. – Mineral depletion and scarcity
Of the rare elements considered here, it is probably only helium that will become
scarce in the course of this century due to its physical depletion in the Earth’s crust.
Helium is contained only in accessible quantities in natural gas deposits, as has been
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discussed in sect. 4. We use the words “scarce” and “scarcity” with care, since they are
concepts that can only be defined in economic terms. Scarcity pertains when a limited,
or decreased, availability of a particular resource leads to increased prices on a real,
inflation-adjusted basis. In most situations supply will match demand: If the mineral
resource is perceived as effectively inexhaustible, then output will expand until the extra
cost of producing just one more ton is covered by the market price. If the consumer is not
in a position to pay the price for the amount he needs, he switches to another metal or
material, which is referred to as “substitution”. The consumption of exhaustible natural
resources (or of natural resources that are deemed exhaustible) is somewhat different
because the so-called Hotelling rent [55] may also contribute to the costs and thus to
the market price. Space does not permit us to discuss Hotelling theory here. Even if
mineral depletion does not play a role, however, various other factors can cause scarcity
and lead to the designation “critical” discussed in sect. 1. Such factors, both on the
supply and demand sides, are sudden strong economic growth in a country or region, the
rapid introduction of new technologies, monopolistic situations, speculation, politically
motivated embargos (the “security of supply” issue) and extraction as a by-product(as
described in sect. 3).
Mineral depletion may be deemed to have occurred when mining companies are forced
to exploit deposits of increasingly lower grade, or to mine under more difficult conditions,
e.g. at greater depth, so that production costs increase. Due to the introduction of new,
more efficient techniques for prospecting, mining and processing of ores these costs can
in principle be counterbalanced. For most of the 20th century exactly this situation
pertained: real (inflation-adjusted) prices for mineral commodities fell steadily. A further
ramification of this technological progress in extraction is the fact that — in the course
of time — resources have been re-classified as reserves and undiscovered resources as
identified resources. The discovery of new deposits of course also plays an important
role. Copper is an interesting example [27]: in 1970, identified and undiscovered world
copper resources were estimated to consist of 1.6Gt; the reserves were 0.3Gt. Since then,
the world has produced 0.4Gt copper and the reserves are now estimated to be 0.7Gt,
and the global resources possibly 3Gt!
If advances in mining technology cannot compensate for lower grades and more dif-
ficult conditions, then mineral depletion will cause, or contribute to, scarcity. We note
that the downward trend in prices in the 20th century has reversed in the last 10–15
years, despite financial crises and zero economic growth in many countries. The cop-
per price, for instance, is at the time of writing (2014) four times higher than it was in
2000. Does this mean that mineral depletion is already giving rise to scarcity? Or has
the massive increase in demand for raw materials in Southeast Asia been the decisive
factor? These are difficult questions to answer. All we can say is that mineral depletion
could already be affecting the market in some instances, but it is unlikely that beryllium,
indium, dysprosium and tellurium, discussed in sects. 2–4, are affected. We note that
the latter three are actually by-products (even dysprosium, as one of the rarer REE),
which will probably be a more important factor in determining scarcity in the near fu-
ture. Moreover, all four have been characterised by demand-driven price oscillations in
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the last few years, which are probably a greater cause for concern at present. Tellurium,
for which CdTe thin film photovoltaic technology comprises a major application, has
been particularly vulnerable to these fluctuations. Despite the low reserves/resources-
to-primary production ratios in table I there does not seem to be a serious danger of
depletion on a scale that would result in serious consequences in the next few decades,
or even in the next one to two centuries. Even if the requirement for these metals is
as high as the “order of magnitude” estimates above suggest, it is only in the case of
tellurium that the demand from energy applications could cause substantial supply risks.
(Not enough is known about beryllium in order to judge the situation properly for this
element.) Moreover, these estimates are very optimistic as to the extent of the global
Energiewende. The possibility of substitution also exists: silicon technology might even
win out completely in the case of photovoltaics, for example.
Even in a non-regulated market complete exhaustion of a particular mineral will
never occur. The quantity of even the rarest elements present in the continental and
oceanic crusts as well as in the sea itself is simply so vast. If uninhibited extraction were
to continue, however, a situation might be reached, which could be termed “effective”
exhaustion, where the cost of producing a further ton in terms of energy, water and en-
vironmental damage will be so great, that mining activities would automatically cease.
Our society, or world economy, would switch to a cheaper, more readily available, but for
the purpose, less appropriate substitute. In the very long-term, this non-sustainable pro-
cess of “unlimited substitution” could in principle go on indefinitely, but with disastrous
consequences for future generations.
We can only hope that at some point world population and consumption per capita
will cease to grow, in which situation the demand for raw materials will remain constant,
corresponding to a maximum in the level of in-use stock. Under such conditions, im-
proved recycling could in principle then supply the majority of global materials needs.
However, although elements are never destroyed (except in the case of nuclear reactions)
and thus remain potentially available, recycling can never be 100% efficient. Due to the
loss of material at very high dilution in the environment (dispersion) and in the recy-
cling processes themselves, fresh ore will always be necessary. For this reason, effective
exhaustion is probably inevitable, but the timescale on which this will happen is long
term and ill-defined.
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